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Abstract 
The paper examines the impact of selected structural adjustment policies on food 
production in Zambia. Using a four-year panel of post-harvest data, a system of six 
crops, two variable inputs and three fixed inputs is estimated. The resulting supply 
responses suggest a negatively sloped supply curve for sorghum and millet, which is 
attributed to the presence of credit constraints. Simulations are conducted to asses the 
impact of the removal of subsidies and exchange rate controls. The results indicate that 
these policies have led to increased food production although the magnitude of the 
increase is in general not very large. The results also indicate a significant fall in fertilizer 
use. Information, credit and distance to markets are also very important variables for 
food production. Deliberate efforts are needed to develop both input and output markets 
and to provide more formal credit institutions targeted at small-scale farmers
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1. Introduction 
or over two decades, the Zambian economy was dominated by government 
ownership. The government regulated commodity and food prices and food 
consumption was heavily subsidized. The mainstay of the economy was mining, 
with revenue from the export of copper used not only to finance domestic expenditure 
but also to import food in years of shortages. The impact of the oil crises of the 1970s, 
falling copper prices and the resulting general economic deterioration shifted the focus 
to agriculture as a possible source of growth, export revenue and increased food 
availability. 
To recover from the economic problems that the country was experiencing, the 
government turned to borrowing both domestically and internationally. With no 
significant recovery in either copper revenues or agriculture, the balance of payments 
and fiscal deficits became enormous and ultimately the country started to get conditional 
loans, which was the beginning of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in Zambia. 
The general objectives in the agricultural sector were the reduction of government 
intervention in the market, the promotion of agricultural or non-traditional exports,.and 
the improvement of food production. In practice, macro level implementation involved 
freeing the exchange rate, liberalizing trade, freeing interest rates, removing subsidies 
and all forms of price controls, and abolishing state agricultural companies and marketing 
boards. 
More than a decade later, the expected benefits of these reforms do not seem to be 
very visible in the agricultural sector. The objective of this study is to look at the impact 
of some of the policies that were implemented as part of the SAPs in Zambia. Supply 
responses of food production amongst small-scale farmers are estimated and used to 
simulate the effects of the removal of subsidies and exchange rate controls. Six food 
crops (maize, sorghum, millet, groundnuts, sweet potatoes and cassava) are included in 
the system. Of these, maize is the most rain-fed, while sorghum, millet and cassava are 
quite drought resistant and are a potential substitute in making nshima, the staple starch 
for almost the whole country. Sweet potatoes are also a major food crop grown and 
consumed almost all over the country. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background on the 
agricultural sector in the backdrop of the macroeconomic environment. This is followed 
by the discussion of the methodology and empirical model in Section 3 and presentation 
of the results in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with a summary and policy implications. 
1 
2. Agriculture and the macroeconomic 
environment 
The changes in both the agricultural sector and the macro economy as a whole resulting from the implementation of SAPs in Zambia have obviously had a significant effect on agricultural and food production. Take the exchange rate, 
for example. The dependence of Zambian maize production on imported fertilizers and 
other chemicals means that the liberalization of the exchange rate affects the cost of 
production for maize. Where agricultural produce is exported, this also affects the price 
farmers receive for their crop. Trade liberalization will also affect the farmers because 
of changes in terms of trade between traded and non-traded goods for both agricultural 
and manufactured goods. 
Liberalization of the credit market has also had significant effects on the agricultural 
sector. Before the reforms, the agricultural sector was a major beneficiary of low-interest 
loans. When this situation changed, access to credit declined, which may have contributed 
to the fall in agricultural output. It is clear that both macroeconomic and agriculture 
specific reforms have a potentially significant impact on agricultural output and food 
production in particular. In this section, we look at the evolution of the general macro 
economy in post-independence Zambia. We then proceed to look in more detail at the 
reforms that have been implemented in the agricultural sector. 
Macroeconomic reforms 
During the early years of independence, Zambia benefited from high copper prices on the world market. Copper constituted over 90% of the foreign exchange earnings, 
about 70% of the government budget and over 40% of GDP. The revenue from copper 
was used to finance the provision and expansion of free social services such as education 
and health. Many consumption commodities especially those in agriculture were 
subsidized. The rationale was that the urban population was large and it was important 
to provide enough and affordable food to everyone. The output and prices of copper 
continued to be good and real GDP grew at an average of 2.3% per year (World Bank, 
1984). Because of this, exports were generally greater than imports and there were no 
major problems with the external balance. The shortfall in food supply was met by 
increased imports, while an import substitution strategy was put in place to encourage 
local manufacturing. Most firms were highly dependent on imported inputs, however, 
and the import bill continued to be high. Again the export revenues from copper provided 
the needed foreign exchange. Administrative controls were also put in place as part of 
broader development policies. Commercial banks were required to give a percentage of 
their lending to agriculture at preferential interest rates. The public sector played a very 
2 
FOOD PRODUCTION IN ZAMBIA: THE IMPACT OF SELECTED STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT POLICIES 3 
big role in economic development with most of the key firms being parastatals. 
In the mid 1970s. copper prices on the world market began to decline. This was 
believed to be a short-run situation and the government made no effort to adjust national 
consumption.1 Instead, the financing gap was met by borrowing from both the domestic 
and international markets, a move that shielded public consumption from the effects of 
economic decline. The oil shock of 1973/74 and the resulting world recession reduced 
the demand for copper and led to reductions in export revenue. The reliance of the 
manufacturing industry on imported raw materials and spare parts also led to reduced 
capacity utilization and a fall in real GDP. The result was a shortage of foreign exchange 
and a negative current account. With no improvement in copper receipts and no attempt 
at serious diversification of the economy, the country accumulated large arrears on loan 
repayments. The government responded by increasing borrowing and putting more trade 
barriers and other controls in place. 
During this period. Zambia operated a fixed exchange rate system. Between 1964 
and 1968. the official currency in Zambia was the Zambian pound, which was pegged 
to the British pound and fully convertible. In 1968, the currency was changed to the 
kwacha and de-linked from the pound and linked to the US dollar and later to the special 
drawing rights (SDR) in 1976. Despite the pressure on the exchange rate, the kwacha 
remained fixed and the exchange rate was maintained through administrative controls 
such as import licensing and through monetary expansion. Licensing was based on a 
priority list of goods and services determined by the government's development 
objectives. Import quotas and high tariffs were also used. 
By the early 1980s, however, it was apparent that Zambia was an economy under 
pressure. Its borrowing options narrowed and in 1983 Zambia received the first 
conditional loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The World Bank and the 
IMF increasingly influenced the implementation of economic policy. The government 
embarked on a programme to reduce the current account deficit and its external payment 
arrears, decontrol domestic prices, reduce subsidies on basic food and fertilizer, and 
relax interest rate ceilings. 
In response, the institutionally set interest rates were increased. Between January 
1983 and January 1987, when the reforms were briefly abandoned, the lending rate 
increased by 154 percentage points while the Treasury bill rate increased by about 195% 
- from 9.5% to 28%. In 1983, a basket of the currencies of Zambia's five major trading 
partners was introduced. The kwacha was now adjusted within a narrow range and set 
to depreciate at 1% per month, a percentage that was increased to 2.5% by 1984. The 
intention was to let the kwacha settle to a realistic market value. The foreign exchange 
auction was introduced in October 1985 with the official exchange rate at 2.2 kwacha 
per dollar; by the beginning of 1987 the exchange rate had increased to 15 kwacha per 
dollar. 
Despite these reforms, the economy continued to decline although the decline slowed 
down. In response, the government put in place much sterner measures. In 1985, the 
foreign exchange weekly auction was started to put the exchange rate on a path to being 
market determined. The trade and payments systems were also to be liberalized. Treasury 
bill auctions were introduced to help free the interest rates and mop up excess liquidity 
in the economy. Prices were deregulated and subsidies removed for all crops and 
commodities except maize and fertilizer. 
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In 1986, a price decontrol for breakfast maize meal was announced. The ensuing 
devaluation and price decontrols led to marked increases in inflation. Between 1983 
and 1987, the consumer price index (CPI) inflation more than doubled from 19.6 to 43. 
During the same period, there was significant growth in monetary aggregates, which 
also contributed to increases in inflation. In 1987, as the economy wide reforms 
progressed, maize subsidies were also removed.2 Coupled with the effects of the auction 
of the kwacha, which increased consumer prices, riots erupted in the country especially 
on the Copperbelt.3 As a result, the auction was suspended in early 1987 and the kwacha 
was revalued. Price controls were also re-introduced. By May, the government succumbed 
to the domestic pressure and broke ties with the IMF and World Bank. 
The government embarked on a new development initiative - the New Economic 
Recovery Programme (NERP). One of the major issues was to influence consumption 
patterns to change in favour of local products. There was emphasis on internally generated 
resources to finance growth and development rather than relying on aid. Imports were 
controlled and key products were rationed. Consumption of locally produced goods 
and services was encouraged. 
When the reform programme was abandoned, the foreign exchange auction was 
replaced by a foreign exchange allocation system under a Foreign Exchange Management 
Committee (FEMAC) and the exchange rate was re-valued from 21 to 8 kwacha to the 
dollar. In February 1987, the interest rates were also revised downwards. Aid stopped 
flowing from the IMF and the World Bank and the plan was to rationalize the use of 
foreign exchange so that it could compensate for this loss of funds through net export 
earnings. Repayment of the existing debt was limited to 10% of net export earnings. 
Many members of the donor community withdrew and the country experienced an 
acute shortage of foreign exchange. This led to a chronic shortage of imported inputs 
and consumer goods. However, there was improved economic growth. Net exports were 
positive mainly due to a significant fall in imports. The resulting pressure and the 
escalating external debt forced the government to return to IMF/WB sponsored 
programmes in 1989. These were re-implemented with increased intensity. The kwacha 
was devalued, minimum reserve requirements increased and maize meal prices increased. 
The new programme was formalized through a policy framework paper (PFP) whose 
immediate goal was to reduce inflation and create a stable macroeconomic climate for 
growth and diversification. There was renewed emphasis on the role of agriculture and 
small-scale industries, the two sectors believed to be labour intensive and therefore 
having potential to generate needed employment. They were also expected to provide a 
lot of forward and backward linkages for the more established manufacturing industry. 
Another initiative, dubbed the New Economic Programme, was put in place in 1989. 
The features of this programme were basically the same as those under NERP except 
that they were implemented with more intensity. The key monetary action was to mop 
up liquidity in the economy. The minimum reserve requirements of commercial banks 
were increased and government bonds were introduced. 
Nominal interest rates were also increased. Between the reintroduction of the reforms 
in 1989 and September 1992, when the interest rates were liberalized, the lending rate 
increased from 18.4% to 58.5% while the Treasury bill rate increased from 18.5% to 
47%. The exchange rate was devalued and later the fixed exchange rate was abandoned 
for a crawling peg. In 1990, a two-tier exchange rate system was introduced with the 
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official tier determined by the Bank of Zambia under FEM AC and the second tier operated 
with a market determined rate and used for imports under the open general licence 
system (OGL). Exporters of non-traditional exports were allowed to retain 50% o f their 
export earnings in foreign exchange. Under the new intensified reform programme, the 
inflation rate began to fall. The introduction of multiparty politics in Zambia i n 1991 
disturbed the programme as the then ruling government began to backtrack on its 
commitments as a campaign strategy in the run up to the presidential elections. 
Then, in October 1991, a new government was ushered into power. The programme 
implemented by the new government differed from the previous one only by t h e pace 
and rigour with which it was implemented. From 1992, Zambia entered a Rights 
Accumulation Programme (RAP) meant to facilitate the clearing of arrears on debt to 
the IMF. After proper completion. Zambia would be entitled to a concessional loan 
facility with only 0.5% annual interest. The new programme required tight monetary 
and fiscal policies. But the new government had a strong domestic mandate a n d was 
able to implement the reforms without much resistance or social unrest. 
The Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) was formed to implement tax reforms and 
improve revenue collection. The government tried to implement the cash budget strategy 
started in 1993. This strategy required that revenue had to be raised before it cou ld be 
spent. Cutting the domestic budget entailed the withdrawal of government from economic 
business, the majority of which was agricultural. Many parastatals were either privatized 
or liquidated. The introduction of the auctioning of government debt in March 1993 
allowed Treasury bill rates to be market determined and marked the end of preferential 
lending to the agricultural sector. By 2001, the cash budget policy was abandoned because 
of constrained government funding. 
In December 1995. the RAP was successfully completed and the IMF approved loans 
totalling $1,313 billion and admitted Zambia to the enhanced structural adjustment facility 
(ESAF). The major part of the loan ($1,047 billion) was provided under a three-year 
ESAF arrangement and the remainder under a one-year structural adjustment facility 
(SAF) arrangement in support of the government's economic and financial reform 
programme. The aim of the new programme was to strengthen macroeconomic 
stabilization efforts while consolidating and advancing the structural reforms begun 
under RAP (IMF, 1995).4 Macroeconomic policy in the last ten years has not seen much 
change from these goals. The poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) brought renewed 
emphasis on poverty reduction and subsequently more emphasis on agriculture. 
ne of the main arguments in favour of market liberalization in the agricultural 
sector is based on the benefits of market prices. It has been argued that controlled 
prices are in favour of the consumer and are a tax to the producer. The removal o f these 
subsidies and controls would lead to higher output prices, which would in turn a c t as an 
incentive for increased production (GRZ, 1995). To this effect, liberalization attempts 
were made in the early 1980s and fully embarked on in 1991. 
In the early 1980s, subsidies on crops such as sorghum, millet and cassava were 
removed. Because of the importance of maize in the consumption basket o f most 
Agricultural reforms in Zambia 
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Zambians, the maize subsidies were to be removed gradually over the years. In 1984, 
maize subsidies were just 5.5% of domestic expenditure but by the late 1980s had 
become as high as 16% (World Bank 1994). The pressure to remove the subsidies was 
very strong and in 1986 they were removed. This together with increases in the exchange 
rate resulting from the exchange rate auctioning sparked major food riots. The 
government then abandoned the reforms and re-introduced the subsidies in 1987. By 
1989 when the reform programme was restarted, maize subsidies accounted for as 
much as 40% of the domestic deficit. With the election of a new government in 1991, 
agricultural reforms were fully implemented beyond just removal of subsidies. 
In addition to subsidies on grains, agricultural inputs were also subsidized. Fertilizer 
and seed were subsidized and inputs were delivered to the farmers via several National 
Marketing Board (NAMBOARD) depots located in all the districts. These were also 
the depots where farmers delivered their crop output for the government to sell. The 
government operated a policy of "pan-territorial" and "pan-seasonal" pricing that 
entailed same prices throughout the country and through the year. The margins set by 
the government between the buying and selling prices were small and often the gains 
were felt in deficit rather than surplus areas. 
A number of issues arise from this. First, farmers had no need or indeed incentive to 
look for a market for their produce. Transport and accessibility issues did not arise. The 
government both delivered inputs and collected output. In addition, the government set 
the prices for both inputs and output. Second, the system provided an incentive to 
move away from the production of other food crops such as sorghum, millet and cassava. 
These crops are drought resistant and are more of the traditional crops in certain parts 
of Zambia than is maize. All four crops can be used to make nshima, the traditional 
staple food in the country. In effect, the existing marketing policy tended to encourage 
inefficiency and lack of entrepreneurship on the part of the farmers. 
Agricultural finance was provided in two main ways. The first was through loans 
provided by the government-owned Agricultural Finance Company (AFC). This 
company provided both cash and input credit. Second, commercial banks were required 
by law to give a percentage of their lending to the agricultural sector. The lending 
provided to the farmers was also subsidized. Repayment of these loans was very poor, 
however, and monitoring was inadequate. This tended to increase the government deficit, 
which often had to bear the losses of the parastatals. In the face of these policies, the 
government experienced serious financing constraints and continuously incurred debt. 
With the implementation of the SAPs, marketing boards and other parastatals such 
as the AFC were abolished and all subsidies removed on inputs. By 1992, the dismantling 
of the marketing boards was under way. Prices were liberalized, subsidies removed and 
all active government participation in agribusiness withdrawn. On the wider macro 
level, interest rates were liberalized, administrative controls on banks removed and the 
exchange rate floated. 
Liberalization of financial markets and the removal of controls on credit and its 
pricing meant that farmers have to compete for credit with other potential borrowers in 
the country. Where farmers do not have adequate collateral and are high risk (especially 
for small-scale farmers), access to credit has reduced significantly - the situation of the 
majority of medium- and small-scale farmers. In cases where farmers have obtained 
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credit and had a bad harvest, they have lost almost everything they have in loan 
repayments. The result is that many small- and medium-scale farmers have no access to 
credit. A number of non-government organizations have made efforts to lend inputs but 
the coverage of these programmes is limited. Existing outgrower schemes mainly focus 
on cash crops and are limited to less than a third of the whole country. Initiatives attempted 
by the government have not worked (Mwanaumo, 1999). Most of these attempts have 
not particularly targeted medium- or small-scale farmers and in effect have had the 
same failures as the private sector credit.5 This failure has the potential to reduce food 
production because a lot of these farmers depend on credit for input supply. 
The abolition of NAMBOARD affected the transportation of both inputs to the 
production centres and output to the consumption centres. Most of the small-scale farmers 
growing grains are in remote areas of the country that are not easily accessible and far 
from the urban areas that are the main consumption centres. The state of the roads in 
most of these areas is bad and hence access to the market is even more constrained. 
Without proper or organized marketing arrangements in rural areas, as was the case 
before the reforms, output is likely to fall because of limited access to both output and 
input markets. Mwanaumo and Preckel (1997) simulate possible effects of liberalization 
on maize marketing and find that there are likely to be some welfare gains despite the 
increases in transport costs. The reality, however, is that access to markets by small-
scale farmers has declined significantly. This has been compounded by inconsistent and 
contradictory local government policies. For example, many local governments have 
imposed a tax on the movement of maize from surplus to deficit areas where prices are 
higher. This has also compounded food insecurity. The taxes imposed are often prohibitive 
and farmers would rather keep their maize. In many cases, private grain traders either 
have to pay a bribe to the local council or buy the maize from the farmers at a very low 
price in order to maintain their margins. 
The dependence of Zambian maize production on imported fertilizers and other 
chemicals means that the liberalization of the exchange rate had an affect on the cost of 
production for maize. Where agricultural produce is exported, the exchange rate also 
affects the price farmers receive for their crop. Combined with other trade liberalization 
measures, changes in terms of trade between the tradeable and non-tradeable goods will 
also affect the farm gate prices that farmers receive. The removal of exchange rate 
controls can be a mixed blessing for food producers, however. While liberalizing the 
exchange rate implies the removal of the implicit taxation of agriculture due to an over-
valued exchange rate, higher exchange rates imply higher production costs due to 
imported inputs. For example, Jansen (1990) estimates that domestic maize prices were 
about 77% of border prices at the official exchange rate. On the one hand, if maize 
production is responsive to output prices as suggested by some studies, removing these 
controls implies significant gains in maize production. On the other hand, the same 
process may significantly increase the cost of inputs such as fertilizer to a point of 
wiping out the gains made due to price increases. 
Reforms also pose the possibility of shifting farm activity into cash crops. This shift 
would mainly be amongst commercial farmers, leaving food production to small-scale 
farmers whose access to export markets and possibly required technology is limited. 
For most of the period since the reforms, Zambia, along with other southern African 
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countries, has experienced severe droughts. As a result of this, there has been a shift 
towards more traditional and drought resistant crops such as cassava, millet and sorghum. 
The removal of pan-territorial pricing may also have contributed to this shift by removing 
the surplus gains provided by these implicit subsidies. These crops are also less demanding 
chemical fertilizers and the increased fertilizer prices arising from the liberalization of 
the exchange rate m a y have had an effect. 
The role for the government under the reformed agricultural sector is mainly to 
formulate policy and provide an enabling environment for the private sector. The enabling 
environment entails provision of support services such as roads and information. Although 
there have been attempts at improving feeder roads, most of the remote areas are no 
better then they were before the reforms and the major beneficiaries of the reforms are 
those farmers located along the line of rail. The limitations of the market have also led 
the government to g e t involved again in the provision of inputs such as fertilizer. In 
some places, the government has re-implemented subsidies although these are under a 
gradual reduction programme. The government also sets floor prices, especially for 
maize, due to underhanded methods used by grain traders to buy maize at very low 
prices from the small-scale farmers. In many cases, however, there is no enforcement of 
these floor prices and farmers still have to sell their crops at very low prices. 
An agricultural market information service was started in 1993 with the creation of 
an information department under the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF 
- now the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives). This department was to disseminate 
market information o n prices and quantities of various agricultural products. But, the 
dissemination and use of information has been limited (Mwanaumo and Preckel, 1997). 
The extension officers are the point of contact with the farmers and in many cases they 
do not have enough resources to do their job. Information from the local farmers to the 
department does not flow very well either. There have been instances where the 
government provided subsidized fertilizer through the extension officers who ended up 
selling the fertilizer at higher prices to the farmers. The farmers buy this fertilizer because 
'hfUj. •liavtnfo'KiioWieiige'iiiat 'it 'is subsidized.There have been other information 
constraints at the farm level mainly due to lack of dissemination and monitoring. Although 
radio programmes are run by the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, most small-
scale farmers have no access to radios and their best source of information remains the 
extension officers. 
Food production trends in Zambia 
Despite the reforms, food security has not improved in the country. In 1994, a third of the population (33%) was said to be vulnerable to food insecurity (Shawa and 
Shuba, 1994). By 1997, this figure had risen to 82% in some areas of the country (CSO, 
1998). The drought in the 2000/01 farming season brought more than 25% of the 
population face to f a c e with complete starvation. Without the copper revenues for 
importing food, the country was at the mercy of foreign donors hence the controversies 
that arose over genetically engineered maize. 
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Zambia show that supply response to output prices is not very strong. Mwansa (1992) 
in a study of maize and cash crops found that crop supply responds to prices. The same 
conclusion was reached by Hamusankwa (1997) in a study on the responsiveness of 
maize and sorghum. An earlier study by Mwanza (1989) shows that although farmers 
are responsive to own prices, they are more responsive to non-price factors such as the 
performance of the non-agricultural sector and prices of other crops. A study by Rrapft 
and Mwape (1990) found that maize supply was more responsive to fertilizer prices 
than to own prices. 
Despite these studies, a substantial knowledge gap remains in the area of factors that 
affect food production in Zambia. First, all the accessible studies have focused on maize. 
Although maize is still the most important staple for the country, it has become quite 
important to explore the possibility of diversification into more drought resistant and 
less input demanding crops. Second, except for the study by Hamusankwa (1997), all 
these studies covered periods before structural adjustment was fully undertaken. Our 
study also differs in that we take account of the simultaneous decision making process 
of the farmer where a household grows more than one of the grains in question. We 
include a number of non-price factors as well. Studies in other African countries have 
shown that most reform programmes in the agricultural sector have not yielded the 
expected results because of some non-price factors, whose constraining influence may 
not be relaxed through improved price incentives (Oyejide, 1990; Cheru, 2002). 
3. Methodology 
It has been argued that macroeconomic performance under a programme should be compared with the counterfactual, defined as the macroeconomic performance that would have taken place in the absence of the programme (see Khan. 1990). Although 
it is the most appealing yardstick by which to assess programme performance, the 
counterfactual cannot be measured or observed and therefore must be estimated or 
approximated. Three approaches have been used widely in assessing the effect of IMF 
funded adjustment programmes to approximate the counterfactual. These include the 
before-and-after approach, which compares the performance of the economy before 
and after the programme; the with-and-without approach, which compares economic 
performance of an adjusting economy against a non-adjusting one; and the actual-versus-
target approach where performance targets are set for the economy and the impact of 
the programme is judged on the basis of how well it performs against the preset targets. 
It is important to point out that all these methods are plagued with difficulties and 
none is superior to the others. Results obtained using any one of them must therefore be 
interpreted within the caveat of their limitations (Killick, 1995; Gibbon, 1996). The 
problem with the before-and-after approach, for example, is that all outcomes are assumed 
to be due to the programme. There is no way of controlling for exogenous variables. 
The with-and-without approach is a variant of the before-and-after approach. The 
performance of adjusting countries is compared with those of similar but non-adjusting 
countries before and after adjustment. The difference in performances is then attributed 
to the programme policies and the performance of the non-adjusting country is used as 
the counterfactual. 
Although the with-and-without approach allows the identification of exogenous 
shocks and resulting possible effects, it requires stringent assumptions to implement 
realistically. Most important of these assumptions is that the country chosen as the 
control must closely describe the counterfactual for the country that is being analysed. 
Furthermore, the countries that adjust self-select so that the performance of such a 
country post adjustment is a combination of the impact of the programme and the 
country's own characteristics. Isolating the effects of adjustment policies by using a 
non-adjusting country as a control, therefore, becomes very difficult. Where both 
countries are adjusting, this comparison would still be problematic because programmes 
tend to be country specific. Moreover, even where programmes are very similar, their 
implementation is likely to differ. In some cases, countries may not implement 
programmes completely, making the analysis even more difficult. Goldstein and Montiel 
(1986) discuss ways of modifying this approach to obtain more robust results. 
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Table 1: Estimated supply and demand system 
Output supply Input demand Fixed inputs 
Constant Maize Millet Sorghum Ground 
-nuts 
Potatoes Cassava Fertilizer Labour Info Rain Distance 
Maize 3.98 
(2.86) 
C.461 
(0.024) 
0.011 
(0.011) 
-0.013 
(0.006) 
0.022 
(0.04) 
-0.039 
(0.012) 
0.034 
(0.033) 
-0.228 
(0.12) 
-0.248 
(0.121) 
0.471 
(0.531) 
-0.298 
(0.412) 
-0.47 
(0.204) 
Millet -0.048 
(0.097) 
0 .03 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.26 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.066 
(0.018) 
0 .025 
(0.014) 
0.011 
(0.001) 
Sorghum 3.5 
(0.053) 
0 .025 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.003) 
-0.0004 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.014 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.004) 
Groundnuts -0.3 
(0.56) 
0.06 
(0.02) 
0002 
(0.007) 
0.021 
(0.011) 
-0.026 
(0.025) 
-0.05 
(0.024) 
0.04 
(0.102) 
0.08 
(0.079) 
-0.073 
(0.04) 
Pota toes -0.207 
(0.11) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
0.044 
(0.01) 
0 .003 
(0.006) 
0 .018 
(0.021) 
0.036 
(0.016) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
C a s s a v a -2.028 
(0.35) 
0 .23 
(0.024) 
-0.073 
(0.022) 
0.001 
(0.018) 
-0.177 
(0.066) 
0.317 
(0.051) 
0.072 
(0.025) 
Fertilizer -0.372 
(1.672) 
0.102 
(0.074) 
0.185 
(0.071) 
-0.213 
(0.311) 
-0.076 
(0.241) 
0.269 
(0.12) 
Labour 
1=0 
-0.37) 
(1.32) 
0.22 
(0.64) 
0.0 
(0.998) 
0.11 
(0.74) 
0.01 
(0.93) 
0.0 
(0.98) 
0.06 
(0.81) 
0.24 
(0J327) 
0.12 
(0.577) 
-0.054 
(0.328) 
-0.047 
(0.255) 
0.217 
(0.126) 
Table 2: O w n and cross price elasticities 
Prices 
Maize Sorghum Millet Groundnut Potatoes Cassava Fertilizer Labour 
Maize 0 . 3 7 " 0.02** 0.07 0.1 0.01*** 0.23 -0.22* -0.27** 
Millet 0.8 0 .07 -0 .36*" 0 .46*" 0.02 0.15 -0.08 -0.007 
Sorghum 0 . 2 4 " -0.32*** 0.09 0.01 - 0 . 1 3 " 0.16 0.15 0.1 
Groundnuts 0.95 0 .005 -0.4** 0 . 09"* 0.1 0.52* -0.28 -0.7** 
Pota toes 0 .06*" -0.07** 0.01 0.08 -0.84 0.09 0.76*** 0.2 
C a s s a v a 0.79 0.04 0.04 0.18* 0.04 -0.69 -0 .26"* 0.15 
Fertiliser -0.8* 0 .03 0 .03 -0.10 0.34*** -0.27*** -0.21 1 .28*" 
Labour -0.58** 0.04 0 .003 0.05** 0.19 0.31 0.61*** -0.01 
* significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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negative elasticities for millet, sorghum and cassava can be explained by the relationship 
between output prices and seed prices plus the increase in organizations promoting these 
crops as drought resistant alternatives. This point is discussed in more detail in the following 
section. 
The own and cross price elasticities are calculated from the estimated parameters at 
mean values; these are shown in Table 2. 
Out of the ten significant cross price elasticities, six are positive, reflecting 
complementary relationships. The magnitudes for most of these are similar to those 
found in studies on other African countries.8 The lack of competition in the crops reflects 
the way in which these crops are used. In most districts, sorghum, millet and cassava are 
grown both for beer brewing and for home consumption. For both uses, maize is combined 
with one or more of the other three crops. However, maize is more commercialized than 
the other three crops. In areas where sorghum and millet are consumed as the staple 
food, maize is not traditionally grown and its importance in these areas began with the 
introduction of maize subsidies in the late 1960s, making it mainly a commercial rather 
than a subsistence crop.9 It is interesting to note that some of the cross price elasticities 
with respect to maize are almost as high as own-price elasticities and that for others, the 
price of maize is more important than the crop's own price. Again this is indicative of 
the commercial nature of maize production even amongst small-scale farmers. The 
complementary relationships imply that as maize prices rise, there is a tendency for new 
inputs to be drawn into the general production process. Subject to the net effect, there 
seems to be a potential for improving food supply through improved maize prices. 
The own-price input demand elasticities are -0.21 for fertilizer and -0.01 for labour; 
neither is significant. The cross input demand elasticities show that the two inputs are 
gross substitutes. It often happens that when farmers cannot afford to buy fertilizer, they 
attempt to increase output by increasing acreage hence increasing their demand for 
labour. The supply elasticities with respect to input prices are generally negative while 
the input elasticities with respect to output prices are generally positive. The fertilizer 
elasticity with respect to the price of maize is surprisingly negative. Since maize is a 
commercial crop, it was expected that an increase in the price of maize would increase 
fertilizer use. It is worth noting, however, that this elasticity is significant only at the 
10% level. 
Perverse supply response 
Although perverse supply response is rarely observed in empirical studies, under certain circumstances, it not only obtains but is in line with rational economic 
behaviour. Since the seminal study by Shultz (1964) in which he presented his view of 
a rational but poor peasant, it has been understood that peasants are price conscious and 
price responsive within the technological constraints they face. This was shown by 
shifts in production between various crops as their relative prices changed. With this is 
implied a positive supply response even amongst peasant farmers. However, several 
empirical studies (for example see Fulginiti and Perrin, 1990, for linseed; Abrar, 2002, 
for barley; Danielson, 2002, for cashew, coffee and cotton) have found perverse supply 
response even amongst commercial farmers (Ozanne, 1999). Askari and Cummings 
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(1976), Rao (1989). and Ozanne (1999) provide a detailed survey of the empirical 
literature.10 
The idea of an upward sloping supply curve is based, amongst other things, on the 
idea that commodities can be divided into distinct inputs and outputs. In a peasant 
agriculture household, this distinction is not clear. Production and consumption decisions 
are intricately tied. When growing crops, seed is often a produced input retained from 
surplus output. In the case of Zambian peasants, it is not only a produced input but a 
residual input. If a family produces enough to eat. then they will save some for planting. 
If not, they will consume everything and buy from surplus neighbours during the planting 
season. The sign of the supply response therefore depends on the relative magnitude of 
the substitution and income effects. There are two possible reasons why we observe a 
negative supply response for sorghum and millet here. The first is that because the cost 
of seed and price of output are tied, increases in the output price will inevitably increase 
the cost of producing the crop. Depending on the demand elasticity of the seed input, 
price increases may reduce the output of the crop. Second, a negative response may be 
observed if supply is increasing against falling prices. We explore each of these 
possibilities in turn. 
Over 80% of the seed used by the households in the sample is retained seed - either 
grown by the household or purchased from surplus households (CSO, 2000). The price 
of cereals increases over the post-harvest season as supply dwindles especially between 
November and May. By the time planting begins, cereal prices are almost 50% higher 
than at the beginning of the harvest season." The implication is that households that 
must buy seed will spend more per kilogram of grain than what they received when they 
sold their crop.12 The increased cost of production would then lead to a fall in marketed 
surplus as households increase their subsistence retention. Output may also fall as 
production shifts to "less expensive" crops. 
A negative supply response can also result when output is increasing despite the 
falling prices. We use real 1994 prices in the study and the data show that apart from the 
period between 1997 and 1998, average real prices of the two crops moved downward. 
On the other hand, both output and acreage increased over the same period (CSO, 2000). 
This could in part be explained by the presence of many organizations that encourage 
the growth of these crops and the non-monetary incentives attached. Examples of such 
initiatives are the Sorghum and Millet Improvement Programme (SMIP) under the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the International Crop Research 
Institute for Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), the Root and Tuber Improvement Programme 
(RTIP), and the Potato and Sweet Potato Improvement Programme (PSIP). 
In response, a number of non-government organization (NGOs) put in place 
programmes for small-scale farmers to increase the production of these crops. Since the 
late 1990s most such programmes have taken the form of outgrower schemes where the 
farmers receive seed and other inputs such as lime. They are then required to pay back 
a certain amount of their output with little or no interest, an approach that has proved to 
be very popular amongst farmers who have no collateral for formal credit. In some 
areas, such programmes are available for maize as well but these are very few. This 
tends to push the farmers off their preferred supply curves, however, as subsistence is of 
primary importance in these households. 
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The data show that there is most likely an interplay of the two scenarios set above 
when other crops are included. Maize and groundnuts are the preferred commercial 
crops amongst small-scale farmers in Zambia, which in many cases are inter-cropped 
with sorghum and millet. Higher prices for these crops would mean that deficit households 
will not be able to afford seed and would therefore shift into the production of sorghum 
and millet as a subsistence strategy despite falling prices.13 
Impact of reforms 
Agricultural reforms implemented in Zambia over the past decade have led to significant changes in factors affecting grain production. Most of these have been 
price policies that have raised both input and output prices. Other significant changes 
include the liberalization of the grain market, which in turn has implications for the 
prices farmers get for their produce. The provision of services by the government to 
small-scale farmers also has a significant effect on agricultural output. In this section 
we use results from the estimated food supply system to discuss the possible policy 
effects of liberalizing the exchange rate and removing consumer subsidies. 
For the purpose of the simulations, a policy change is described as a percentage 
price change resulting from the implemented policy. In the discussion, we focus on the 
possible effects of the removal of exchange rate controls and price subsidies. Food 
production in Zambia is dependent on the exchange rate in several ways. One is through 
the impact of input prices, of which the bulk is fertilizer. The other is through the price 
of imported food crops that compete with domestically produced crops. An over-valued 
exchange rate reduces the amount paid to domestic producers in local currency. It also 
makes exports uncompetitive on both the world and the domestic markets, leading 
consumers to substitute for imported food crops. To the extent that devaluing or floating 
the exchange rate will lead to the elimination of this implicit tax on agriculture, output 
of food crops should therefore increase. The dependence of Zambian food production, 
especially maize, on imported inputs implies that potentially there is a possibility that 
the increases in input prices could offset the benefits of improved producer prices. 
Jansen (1990) estimates that the domestic price of maize was only 76% of the border 
price at the official exchange rate and 52% at the equilibrium exchange rate. Using 
these figures, we will assume that the effect of the over-valued exchange rate is 24%, a 
figure quite close to the estimate reached by Fulginiti and Perrin (1990) of the price 
wedge due to export taxes in Argentina. 
Input subsidies were also widely used in agriculture in Zambia. It has been argued 
that food subsides in Africa did not benefit poor farmers, but rather provided cheap 
food for urban residents (Sahn, 2004). Input subsidies were often in form of input credit 
or cheap fertilizer. The removal of such subsidies therefore was commensurate with a 
credit squeeze and an increase in production costs, the implication being a negative 
impact on small-scale food production. Mwanaumo (1999) suggests that maize subsidies 
in Zambia had reached 16% of the price of maize by the late 1980s, while Deininger 
and Olinto (1999) placed the estimate at 70%. We use the more conservative figure 
from Mwanaumo (1999) as our price wedge due to maize price subsidies. The removal 
of price subsidies on sorghum and millet was begun in the early 1980s and so we assume 

2 2 RESEARCH PAPER 159 
changes resulting from the removal of exchange rate controls and subsidies have led to 
increases in food production with the caveat that this positive outlook is mainly due to the 
more traditional non-commercial food crops like millet, cassava and sweet potatoes. 
Non-price factors 
The results show a sluggish response in maize output. This crop is still the major food 
staple in the country and the most commercialized of the food crops. This means that it 
is more dependent on structural variables such as information, distance to market and 
credit than the other crops. It is also the most rain-fed food crop in the country. These 
factors may explain why significant increases in maize output have not been realized. 
Our estimations show that maize has a negative response to the distance to the market. 
This variable is also significant for most of the other crops, underscoring the need for 
improved and efficient markets. Several studies have stressed the need for complementary 
policies and investments (Sahn et al., 1997; Robbins and Ferris, 1999; Hammond, 1999). 
Output for crops like cassava whose markets are mainly local increases the longer 
the distance to the market. Markets for most of these crops are basic, on the spot and 
with almost nonexistent market-based risk management. Deliberate efforts to develop 
better markets for these crops need to be put in place to persuade farmers to grow them 
commercially. Providing consumers with information about these crops as alternatives 
to maize would also assist in developing a sustainable market for them. 
The rainfall variable is not significant for maize. This may be explained by the 
persistent drought over all the four years included in the sample. Irrigation projects can 
be introduced that encourage water capture for use during drought periods. The 
information variable is significant in the sorghum, millet and cassava equations. These 
crops are drought resistant and can be used as substitutes for maize. However, they are 
traditionally grown for complementary use with maize. Studies have shown that one of 
the major constraints in using sorghum and millet as maize substitutes is that they take 
considerable effort to de-hull and process into the meal used to prepare the national 
staple, nshima. Modern techniques have been developed that make de-hulling easier. 
Nevertheless, many small-scale farmers continue to use traditional de-hulling methods 
because of lack of either knowledge or resources. Information provision for both 
producers and consumers would help commercialize these crops and increase the gains 
from their production. In addition, such improved de-hulling methods would improve 
both the quality and market value of the crops if they are sold on the market as ready-to-
use meal. 
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
n the study, we look at the impact on food production of policy reform measures 
implemented under structural adjustment programmes in Zambia. A system of six 
crops and two variable inputs is estimated. Elasticities are calculated and used to 
conduct simulations to look at the impact of the reforms. The results indicate that food 
production in general is responsive to prices although the magnitudes are not very large. 
We find a negative supply response for sorghum and millet and we posit two possible 
reasons. The first is that increased prices increase the cost of production since the seed 
prices are a function of the output price. Second, credit constraints may lead farmers 
into growing crops that have non-monetary credit available, which allows them to make 
repayments in a form that is easy for them. This moves the farmers from their preferred 
supply curve and could result in inefficiency. Coupled with information provision, credit 
could also enhance the use of high yielding varieties, and the correct use of inputs such 
as fertilizers. There is need to improve credit provision for small-scale farmers. The 
obvious problem is how to design credible, farmer-friendly forms of repayment. 
We also find that almost all the crops in the system are more responsive to the price 
of maize than to their own prices. The maize response is more sluggish, however, and 
we surmise that this is due to structural factors such as bad roads, undeveloped markets 
and poor rainfall. Although the maize markets are limited, their existence allows this 
crop to be grown commercially even by small-scale farmers. Development of markets 
for other crops is needed. Deliberate initiatives such as the Sorghum and Millet 
Improvement Programme (SMIP) could be put in place to promote the consumption of 
these crops as alternatives to maize and thereby create a market for them. 
The fixed factors discussed above have remained relatively unchanged since the 
reforms and in some cases have deteriorated. Given the central role that maize seems to 
play in increasing total food production, it is very important for the government to 
remove the constraints surrounding the production of maize. Rainfall continues to be a 
problem for the production of maize and irrigation projects that enhance water capturing 
should be encouraged. We conclude that although the price incentives provided by reforms 
have contributed to some increase in food production in the country, greater increases 
have been hampered by lack of improvement in structural variables. 
The results obtained in the study are important to the development of small-scale 
agriculture in Zambia, but they must be presented with a few caveats. First, reforms in 
the agricultural sector are still going on and there has been a lot of going forth and back 
in policy. Although fertilizer subsidies were officially removed by 1994, there have 
been intermittent reintroductions and withdrawals over the last ten years. It is also 
important to mention that the method used for the simulations is linear and may lead to 
2 3 
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overestimations. The results must therefore be interpreted with the caution that it is the 
whole picture that is more important rather than the actual magnitudes estimated. A lot 
more work needs to be done to identify factors that can improve not only food production 
but small-scale agriculture as a whole. Credit design, development of input markets and 
the role of institutions in enhancing small-scale agriculture are just a few of the areas 
needing further research. 
Notes 
1. The World Bank and the majority of the donor community also perceived this as a short-
run problem and therefore made no attempt to push the country to change its development 
strategy (West, 1989; Bonnick. 1997). 
2. Maize is the staple food in Zambia and had thus far been heavily subsidized by the 
government. When price controls were removed on other food crops such as cassava and 
sorghum, maize subsidies were maintained with the view to remove them gradually. 
3. The Copperbelt is one of the largest and most urbanized provinces in Zambia. It holds 
almost all of Zambia 's copper mines. 
4. Zambia had a three-year ESAF programme starting in 1999 and completed in 2001. The 
ESAF programme was renamed the Poverty Reduction Growth Facility in November 1999. 
These are more based on country-owned poverty reduction strategies drawn by each country 
with IMF assistance, and the participation of local civil society and development partners. 
5. There was an attempt at a credit import facility in 1996, a market credit revolving fund 
and the agricultural credit management programme, none of which have yielded any 
substantial results. 
6. The data for analysis are aggregated over farmers in the same Census Supervisory Area 
(CSA).These are sub-areas of a district consisting of several households living close to 
each other. 
7. p shows the correlation between the selection equation and the equation of interest. When 
p differs significantly from zero, the bias is large and the selection model should be used. 
8. See Govinda and Babu (2001) and Abrar (2002), for example. 
9. Apart from maize, which is generally consumed everywhere in the country, millet, sorghum 
and cassava are considered to be traditional foods in some parts of the country. In these 
areas, these crops are used alongside maize to make nxhima, the main staple in the country. 
For example, in the 1999/2000 season, Eastern (32%), Southern (29%) and Central (14%) 
provinces accounted for 75% of all maize production, and Northern (20.6), Southern (19) 
and Western (14) provinces for 63.6% of all sorghum produced. Northern (57%), Western 
(18%) and Central (9%) accounted for 84% of all millet produced and Luapula, Northern 
and Western provinces accounted for over 75% of all the cassava grown. 
2 5 
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10. Ozanne argues that empirical evidence does not support this view, often because such 
evidence tends to confirm the preconceptions of the researchers and thus empirical results 
that do not have the "correct" sign tend to be rejected and therefore go unreported in 
academic publications. In the studies cited here, the negative elasticities are either just 
highlighted or overlooked with no discussion. 
11. See WFP (2005). 
12. Households will sell some of their output even when they are not surplus households to 
get money for other goods such as education, health, soap and transport. 
13. See Robbins and Ferris (2003) for more discussion of the impact of liberalization and non 
price factors on African agriculture. 
f 
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